IAEA Chief Calls US-Saudi Nuclear Deal Inspection Terms Very Satisfactory
UN nuclear watchdog head Rafael Grossi endorsed the inspection provisions of a planned US-Saudi civil nuclear pact despite the absence of the gold standard Additional Protocol, and reported fresh expansion of North Korea's enrichment program.
By Grace Almasi ·

The head of the United Nations nuclear watchdog said Wednesday that the inspection provisions in a planned nuclear cooperation deal between the United States and Saudi Arabia are very satisfactory, even though the arrangement stops short of the Additional Protocol widely regarded as the gold standard of safeguards.
The proposed civil nuclear cooperation pact, known as a 123 agreement, still requires approval from US lawmakers. Nonproliferation experts have criticized it because it would not bar Riyadh from enriching uranium or reprocessing spent reactor fuel, two activities that offer potential pathways to a nuclear weapon.
Saudi Arabia's nuclear program is in its early stages. The kingdom recently signed a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which lays out the core obligations of countries possessing nuclear technology, including allowing IAEA inspections of declared nuclear facilities.
The kingdom has not, however, signed the Additional Protocol, which would grant the agency more intrusive powers such as snap inspections at undeclared sites. A US-Saudi text on nuclear safeguards sent to the IAEA for approval by its board, and seen by Reuters, allows snap inspections but only at declared sites.
"I think that for the specific agreement we have, it is a very satisfactory outcome," IAEA chief Rafael Grossi told a press conference during a quarterly meeting of the agency's Board of Governors. Grossi is running to become UN secretary-general, a bid that requires the support or acquiescence of the five permanent members of the Security Council, including the United States.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has said the kingdom will develop nuclear weapons if regional rival Iran does. Iran agreed to implement the Additional Protocol under its 2015 nuclear deal with major powers but stopped in 2021 as the agreement unraveled following the US withdrawal in 2018 under President Donald Trump.
"Obviously, the AP provides more access, and it is in this sense considered by many as the standard," Grossi said. "We think it's good that countries have Additional Protocols and perhaps this will be the case in the future."
Under the text seen by Reuters, activities including enrichment and reprocessing would only occur "on a location on a covered site." Saudi Arabia would grant the IAEA short notice access to any place on such a site, with advance notice of at least two hours when the agency is already present on a covered site, and at least 24 hours otherwise.
Grossi also told the 35-nation board that North Korea has built an extension to its original uranium enrichment plant at the Yongbyon nuclear complex as it continues to expand production of weapons-grade material. He said construction of the new extension began in mid-September 2026 and was externally complete by late October, calling the continued growth of the country's enrichment program a cause for serious concern.
The IAEA has had no access to North Korea since Pyongyang expelled its inspectors in 2009 and now observes the country mainly through satellite imagery. Grossi said the agency has observed indications that the 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon, used to produce plutonium from spent fuel, probably continues to operate and is in its seventh irradiation cycle, after which the spent fuel would be removed for reprocessing. He added that a light-water reactor at the site has been operating since April.






